Searching for realism, structure and agency in Actor Network Theory by Dave Elder-Vass (1252800)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
  
Searching for realism, structure, and agency in  
Actor Network Theory 
 
Dave Elder-Vass 
 
 
 
[Note: This is an electronic version of a paper published in the British Journal of 
Sociology. Please cite as: Elder-Vass, D. (2008) 'Searching for realism, structure and 
agency in actor network theory'. British Journal of Sociology 59:3, 455-73.  
© 2010 London School of Economics and Political Science.] 
 
   2
  
Searching for realism, structure, and agency in  
Actor Network Theory 
Abstract 
Superficially, Actor Network Theory (ANT) and critical realism (CR) are radically 
opposed research traditions. Written from a realist perspective, this paper asks 
whether there might be a basis for finding common ground between these two 
traditions. It looks in turn at the questions of realism, structure, and agency, analysing 
the differences between the two perspectives and seeking to identify what each might 
learn from the other.  
Overall, the paper argues that there is a great deal that realists can learn from 
actor network theory; yet ANT remains stunted by its lack of a depth ontology. It fails 
to recognize the significance of mechanisms, and of their dependence on emergence, 
and thus lacks both dimensions of the depth that is characteristic of critical realism’s 
ontology. This prevents ANT from recognizing the role and powers of social 
structure; but on the other hand, realists would do well to heed ANT’s call for us to 
trace the connections through which structures are constantly made and remade. A 
lack of ontological depth also underpins ANT’s practice of treating human and non-
human actors symmetrically, yet this remains a valuable provocation to sociologists 
who neglect non-human entities entirely.  
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Searching for realism, structure, and agency in  
Actor Network Theory
1
 
As a critical realist, it is difficult to read the work of actor network theorists without 
bridling at some of the common assertions that characterise the research tradition. 
Most fundamentally, perhaps, the originators of actor network theory (ANT) launched 
the tradition with a book which argues that science creates the realities it describes 
(Latour and Woolgar 1979), whereas critical realism (CR) itself was launched with 
the claim that science is only meaningful because the deepest level of reality exists 
independently of science and scientists (Bhaskar 1978). Secondly, the constant 
insistence of actor network theorists on tracing the connections between individual 
actors instead of accepting the causal role of social structures seems to imply a 
rejection of the structural moment in sociology that has been stressed by both Roy 
Bhaskar and Margaret Archer (Bhaskar [1979] 1998; Archer 1995). And thirdly, even 
actors are treated in a way that seems thoroughly inconsistent with the realist view: 
human and non-human actors are quite deliberately treated as causally equivalent, 
whereas realists have portrayed human agents as the unique possessors of a 
characteristic range of identities and causal powers, with the result that they must be 
treated quite differently from non-human objects with their own distinctive properties 
and powers (Archer 2000; Archer 2003). 
At least some of these provocative stances may be intended in the spirit of 
Garfinkel’s methodological technique of disrupting our background understandings in 
order to reveal them to us (Garfinkel 1967: ch. 2). If so, the appropriate response is to 
set aside any initial hostility, to examine what lies behind them, and to ask whether 
there might instead be common ground between these two traditions. This paper seeks 
to do this in turn for the questions of realism, structure, and agency, analysing the 
differences between the two perspectives and seeking to identify what each might 
learn from the other. To anticipate the conclusion, I will argue that there is more 
common ground than might at first appear, and indeed there are valuable lessons that 
these two traditions can learn from each other, but there are also fundamental 
ontological differences and so it would be unrealistic to expect outright convergence. 
Before going further, however, it is necessary to qualify any assumption of 
homogeneity within each of these traditions. Within critical realism there are those 
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who adhere to the scientific realism of Bhaskar’s early work, those who adopt his later 
dialectical critical realism, and those who advocate the more spiritual views expressed 
in his most recent work (Dean, Joseph and Norrie 2005). Amongst realists in 
sociology, and perhaps the social sciences in general, the first group are decisively in 
the majority and I shall assume that such a view is representative of critical realism in 
general in this paper. I am less well placed to make judgments on divergent tendencies 
within actor network theory. I shall rely primarily on the work of Bruno Latour and 
John Law. Despite their desire to deny essentialism and to apply this denial to ANT 
itself (Law 1999), I for one have not found any great discrepancies between these 
thinkers, and even their ‘after actor network theory’ seems continuous with earlier 
actor network theory. Still, there are no doubt heterogeneities within this tradition that 
I have neglected.
2
 
Realism and science 
ANT’s claim that science makes the realities it describes is one of the central 
arguments of Latour and Woolgar’s seminal Laboratory Life. Using the term ‘out-
there-ness’ to refer to external reality, they argue that ‘out-there-ness is the 
consequence of scientific work rather than its cause’ (Latour and Woolgar 1986: 182). 
As Law puts it,  
they are telling us that it is not possible to separate out (a) the making of particular 
realities, (b) the making of particular statements about those realities, and (c) the 
creation of instrumental, technical, and human configurations and practices, the 
inscription devices that produce these realities and statements. Instead, all are 
produced together (Law 2004: 31).  
And just to make sure his meaning is clear, Law tells us: ‘Let me emphasise 
that: realities are being constructed’, though he goes on immediately to stress that it is 
not people that construct these realities, but the practices of science. But both Latour 
and Law also insist that, unlike some varieties of social constructionism, actor 
network theory is also realist about the existence of external reality. Out-there-ness 
may be constructed, but it is still out-there, and not just in our heads. Law, for 
example, writes, 
what I am arguing is not a version of philosophical idealism. I am not saying that 
since the world defies any overall attempt to describe and understand it, we can 
therefore realistically believe anything about it we like (Law 2004: 7-8). 
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And Latour has explicitly disavowed any connection with the more extreme 
versions of social constructionism, in which social constructions are arbitrary and ‘not 
true’ (Latour 2005: 88-90). Although science is a process of the construction of facts, 
its products nevertheless are facts – ‘the most ascertained, objective, and certified 
results ever obtained by collective human ingenuity’ (Latour 2005: 89-90). 
On the other hand, Law has argued that ANT is committed to a rather different 
conception of the real than common-sense realism. Beyond the simple belief in ‘out-
thereness’ which we might call primitive realism, he identifies a series of other 
common-sense beliefs about reality, including independence – that ‘external reality is 
usually independent of our actions and especially of our perceptions’ – and 
anteriority – that external reality precedes us (Law 2004: 24-5). He claims that, 
‘realism and critical realism are committed, at least in general, to the… anteriority, 
[and] independence… of the real, as well as its primitive and originary versions’ (Law 
2004: 58). By contrast, for actor network theory, reality is usually independent of 
individuals, but not of scientific practices, and it is usually not anterior to us, though 
science produces a hinterland of devices and practices which become anterior to 
subsequent science (Law 2004: 31-2). 
At first sight, this would seem to conflict with the foundational argument of 
critical realism, Bhaskar’s assertion that ‘It is a condition of the intelligibility of 
experimental activity that in an experiment the experimenter is a causal agent of a 
sequence of events but not of the causal law which the sequence of events enables him 
to identify’ (Bhaskar 1978: 12).  
Bhaskar argues that reality may be divided into three domains: the empirical, 
the actual, and the real. The empirical consists of that which is experienced – those 
events and things that are observed by humans. This is a subset of the actual – that 
which occurs – and the domain of the actual is populated by events and things (or, as I 
shall call them, entities) which may or may not be observed. The actual is in turn a 
subset of the real, which also includes the mechanisms that give rise to causal laws, 
and it is these mechanisms that necessarily pre-exist the scientist. Mechanisms arise 
from the structure of entities, and give them causal powers, also known as emergent 
properties (Bhaskar 1978: 14). Events are caused by the interaction of a variety of 
mechanisms, and the job of the scientist is to arrange empirical events in the course of 
an experiment so as to isolate the action of a single mechanism and thus identify it.
3
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The distinction between the empirical, the actual, and the real provides a dimension of 
depth to CR’s ontology (we will come to a second dimension of depth ontology in the 
section on structure). 
Thus, on the one hand, actor network theorists claim that science produces the 
realities it describes, and on the other, critical realists argue that science only makes 
sense if it is oriented to the discovery of powers and mechanisms that exist 
independently of it (and prior to it). We can begin to reduce the apparent contradiction 
by examining more carefully the nature of the ‘realities’ produced by science. Critical 
realism is perfectly consistent with the argument that science (taken as a complex 
interaction of scientists, social practices, organizations, and material devices) is 
capable of producing realities of certain kinds. We can only understand the real point 
of difference between the two traditions by making clear which kinds of reality each 
of them sees science as producing. 
For realists, then, it is perfectly acceptable to argue that science produces: 
 Material records of its results, including for example figures and graphs on 
pieces of paper, and data in computer systems; 
 Theories, hypotheses, models, explanatory texts, and systems of scientific 
belief; 
 devices based on and instrumentalising its theory;4 and 
 some of the particular actual entities used in its experiments – an animal 
behaviour laboratory might breed its own rats, for example, and manufacture 
the maze through which they are forced to pass. 
 What the experiment does not and can not produce, however, is the 
mechanism being tested. Indeed, if it did so, there would be no point in the 
experiment; this is where Bhaskar’s insight comes in – science gets its meaning from 
the belief that there are such mechanisms that exist independently of the experimental 
environment, and the point of the experimental environment is to prompt the exercise 
of these mechanisms. This particular reality, then – the mechanism being tested – is 
not produced by science; all that science produces is knowledge about this aspect of 
reality.  
A further qualification, in two stages, is necessary here, which arises from the 
argument that mechanisms are carried by actual entities. First of all, I have already 
made clear that mechanisms are implemented by entities, and so it might seem that in 
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creating the entities – say rats – that implement a mechanism, we are creating the 
mechanism itself. It would be more accurate to say, however, that in creating the rats 
we are actualizing the mechanism: we are creating an actual entity that carries the 
mechanism, but we are not creating the real mechanism. The real mechanism, for 
Bhaskar, is the way that a certain type of thing acts, producing a tendency for things 
of this type to create certain sorts of effects; it is not the actual acting of an actual 
instance of the thing. What precedes science, then, is not particular actualizations of 
the mechanism, but the fact that if a thing of this particular type is ever created, it will 
possess the powers arising from the mechanism. 
A similar argument applies at the second stage. We might argue, for example, 
that a laboratory might not just produce rats that actualize some pre-existing rat 
mechanism, but it might innovate in the production of rats. It might genetically 
engineer its rats so as to produce animals with an entirely new capability. Rats that 
can leap over buildings, rats that can fly, rats that can see through concrete walls – let 
your imagination run wild! Let us say that no rats have ever before had this genetic 
structure, this mechanism, or this capability. Would this mean that the laboratory had 
produced a new mechanism, one that did not precede the scientists concerned?  
Once again, there is a sense in which this is true, but there is still a sense in 
which it is not: it was always the case that if a rat appeared with this genetic structure, 
whatever the causal history leading to this, then it would have the potential to develop 
this new capability. This mechanism may never have been actualized before the rats 
were modified, but it was always the case that it would occur if this particular 
configuration of entities was somehow produced. This is the aspect of reality that 
scientists can never make; they can only ever find out about it. This is the aspect that 
is always and necessarily anterior to human intervention. 
This reality, however, is one that does not ‘actually’ exist. It may be 
independent, anterior, definite, and singular, but it is not ‘out-there’. And so it cannot 
be captured by an actualist understanding of reality. This is perhaps counter-intuitive, 
but it is not a contradiction. It really is these mechanisms that scientists are trying to 
discover in their experiments, much of the time, and it really is the presumed 
existence of such mechanisms that makes science make sense. We might query the 
use of the term ‘real’ to describe these non-actual mechanisms, but the terminology is 
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of little importance; it is the fact that such mechanisms are implicit in the nature of the 
universe, whether (and before) we seek to actualize them, that makes them important. 
It is because these mechanisms can be actualized in two ways that science is 
possible and worthwhile: they can be actualized in the entities that possess and 
sometimes exercise them; and they can be actualized (fallibly) in a different sense in 
the theories that we use to describe them. Both of these actualizations may be 
produced by science; but the underlying mechanism may not.  
At this stage we might attempt a synthesis: in realist terminology (because 
ANT does not have the terminology to make this distinction), critical realism could 
accept that science produces actualities of all kinds, though not all particular instances 
of the actual; and actor network theory could accept that real mechanisms are never 
produced by science. In Law’s terms, real mechanisms are always anterior and 
independent; but, ironically, they may not be out-there, if out-there refers to the 
actual, as I suspect it does. If ANT identifies reality with the actual out-there, as it 
would seem to do in the absence of a depth ontology, this would help to explain why 
it overlooks real mechanisms when it argues that science can create realities. 
Statements about being, statements about knowledge 
It remains to be seen whether actor network theorists (or indeed other critical realists) 
would take kindly to such a suggestion. Latour’s rejection of extreme constructionism 
and Law’s rejection of philosophical idealism encourage optimism; but on the other 
hand there are numerous instances in which actor network theorists still make claims 
that critical realists would find hard to accept. 
Latour, for example, argues that ‘Galileo may have constructed the phases of 
Venus, but once that construction was complete her phases appeared to have been 
“always already present” ’ (Latour 1996: 23). Similarly, Annemarie Mol, in 
discussing medical diagnoses of the condition atherosclerosis, argues that the 
condition does not exist until a doctor diagnoses it (Law 2004: 46), and indeed that if 
there are multiple medical departments diagnosing it in different ways, then there are 
‘multiple atheroscleroses’ (Law 2004: 50). Paradoxically, however, ‘this does not 
imply that the doctor brings [the patient’s] disease into being’ (Mol 2002; quoted in 
Law 2004: 46).  
   9
  
Now, although all of these statements refer to actualities rather than 
mechanisms, the critical realist acknowledgement that science can create actualities 
does not extend to these cases. For critical realists, the phases of Venus existed in 
actuality before they were empirically recognized, and a patient’s arteries are furred 
up (or not) before, or whether, they are diagnosed as such. In each case, of course, the 
labels that we attach to these events are constructed by people, and in each case it may 
be impossible for us to recognize or discuss these events without the construction of 
science or narrative, but for realists the description of such actualities is entirely 
distinct from the question of whether they exist; and in each of these cases, the 
actuality concerned exists independently of, and anterior to, the act of their 
description.  
To believe otherwise is to commit what Bhaskar calls the epistemic fallacy, the 
belief ‘that statements about being can always be transposed into statements about our 
knowledge of being’ (Bhaskar 1978: l6). In each of these cases, ANT denies not only 
the separation of the real from the actual, but the separation of the actual from the 
empirical: the implication is that ‘out-there’ does not exist until it has been identified 
and described. Existence independent of our knowledge of it is thus denied.  
ANT, however, has a counter argument (though one that is not to my 
knowledge explicitly counterposed by them to Bhaskar’s position) that represents 
almost a mirror image of this critique. Latour and Woolgar argue that scientific 
statements can be divided into unconditional claims that are taken to be true, and 
perhaps even taken for granted, and statements that are qualified with what they call 
modalities. Modalities qualify statements by specifying particular contexts or sources 
for them – for example, pointing out that a claim is made by x, on the basis of an 
experiment reported in journal y (Latour and Woolgar 1986: 77-9). Such modalities 
are read as casting doubt on the truth of the claim; the claim is not yet well enough 
established to merit unconditional reporting, so its provenance must be stated, with 
the implication that it may still be undermined. One objective of scientists, then, is to 
persuade other scientists that their own claims are well enough established to drop 
such qualifications, to drop or delete the modalities (Law 2004: 27-8; Latour and 
Woolgar 1986: 81). This demodalization deletes all references to the hinterland of 
subjectivity, experiment, and prior theory to leave an unqualified statement that 
therefore appears to relate purely to the external world that exists independently of 
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science. Now, what was previously a statement about a scientific claim made by 
particular people for particular reasons becomes a statement about independent 
reality. ‘Before long, more and more reality is attributed to the object and less and less 
to the statement about the object. Consequently, an inversion takes place: the object 
becomes the reason why the statement was formulated in the first place’ (Latour and 
Woolgar 1986: 177). 
Here, then, there is an implicit reversal of Bhaskar’s position: in a sense they 
are arguing that statements about reality are a kind of ontic fallacy: they are 
statements about what we claim to know about reality and how we know it, that have 
been stripped of the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ until they appear to be statements about 
reality itself. From this perspective, all statements about being have already been 
transposed from statements about our knowledge of being. From this perspective, the 
fallacy is to forget that demodalized statements are dependent and conditional upon 
the scientific work that went before. 
We seem to have arrived at a stand-off here: epistemic fallacy vs. ontic fallacy. 
But are these two positions inherently contradictory? The argument that all 
unconditional scientific statements are demodalized need not lead to the conclusion 
that they are not true, or justified. Indeed, the actor network theorists do not 
themselves come to such a conclusion; for them, as we have seen, demodalized 
statements remain ‘the most ascertained, objective, and certified results every 
obtained by collective human ingenuity’ (Latour 2005: 89-90). And they remain 
statements about external reality. Nor need Bhaskar deny that scientific statements are 
arrived at through a process of modalization and demodalization, because he makes 
no claim to the infallibility of scientific statements about reality. On the contrary, he 
recognizes that all such claims have the status of knowledge, and that all human 
knowledge is fallible. All that he wants to deny is the argument that we cannot make 
claims about external reality. On reflection, then, despite appearing contradictory, 
these metaphysical arguments may be entirely consistent. 
What does pose an obstacle is the multiplication of cases in which ANT 
appears to deny common sense realism: such as the phases of Venus that did not exist 
before Galileo discovered them and the arteries furred only when a doctor diagnoses 
them. These seem to illustrate a second level at which ANT fails to see the need for 
the first dimension of Bhaskar’s depth ontology: the need to distinguish the empirical 
   11
  
from the actual, and to recognize that things may actually exist before we observe 
them. If this is really something that ANT agrees on, it poses a potentially insuperable 
obstacle to reconciliation with critical realism. 
 
Social Structure in Critical Realism 
There is also a second dimension of depth in Bhaskar’s ontology: the recognition that 
reality is stratified into an ontological hierarchy of entities, in which higher level 
entities have emergent properties – properties not possessed by the lower level entities 
that are their parts. This dimension of depth is closely interwoven with the first: it is 
the mechanisms that we find in the domain of the real that are responsible for 
emergent properties, which are synonymous with causal powers, and it is these causal 
powers that interact to produce actual events. Each emergent property of an entity is 
the result of a mechanism that is characterized by the existence of a particular type of 
relations between particular types of parts – which we may call the structure of the 
entity.
5
 This is a recursive relation, in the sense that the parts of any given entity are 
also entities themselves, with their own emergent properties. 
Thus, for example, the emergent properties of a biological cell are the result of 
the sorts of molecules of which it is composed and the set of relations between them 
that constitute them into this type of cell – but they are nevertheless the properties of 
the cell and not of the molecules, since these molecules would not possess those 
properties if they were not organized into this sort of cell. Similarly, the emergent 
properties of the molecules are the result of the sorts of atoms of which they are 
composed and the set of relations between those atoms that constitute them into this 
type of molecule.  
Now this emergentist aspect of depth ontology is central for critical realists 
when we move from metaphysical concerns with the real in general to sociological 
concerns with the classic questions of social structure and agency. For critical realists, 
both social structures and human individuals are entities with emergent properties that 
arise from their ontological structure. Margaret Archer has developed the most 
influential version of the consequent claim that we must regard social structures as 
having causal powers in their own right.
6
 The key point is just the same as for 
emergent properties in general: social structures, like organizations and social 
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institutions, are causally effective in their own right because their causal influence 
only arises when their parts (predominantly human individuals) are organized into this 
sort of structure. The individuals concerned would not have these causal powers if 
they were not organized into such structures, hence these are powers of the structure 
and not of the individuals who are its parts. It is the practice of exploring how these 
mechanisms are produced by emergence that gives critical realism its explanatory 
purchase. 
Archer and Bhaskar have stressed that if structures do have emergent 
properties, then for analytical purposes we can treat individuals and structures as 
distinct (while recognizing that structures are ‘activity dependent’ – i.e. the product of 
the interacting individuals that form their parts). We can therefore analyse the 
interactions between them over time, in what Bhaskar calls the Transformational 
Model of Social Activity, and Archer the morphogenetic cycle (Archer 1995: 76-9; 
Bhaskar 1989: 76-7). Both models include two key moments. In the structural 
moment, individual action is influenced by the causal powers of social structures – 
though not fully determined by it, since other interacting causal powers, including 
those of the individual concerned, interact in determining individual action. In the 
agential moment, individual actions contribute to reproducing and/or transforming the 
structure concerned (again interacting with other causal powers). The consequence is 
that critical realist social theory can recognize that both human individuals and social 
structures (and indeed entities of other kinds) have causal powers that are distinct 
from each other, and that both (or all) interact to determine social events – even 
though human individuals are the parts of the social structures concerned. 
Social structure in ANT 
By contrast, actor network theory shows little evidence of recognizing this second 
dimension of ontological depth. Indeed, it seems consistently hostile to the idea that 
social structure could be of any explanatory significance. Despite occasional heavily 
qualified acknowledgements that structural sociology may sometimes be of value (e.g. 
Latour 1996: 200; Latour 2005: 1, 226-7), the vast majority of ANT writing on the 
subject presents reasons why theorists should substitute explanatory references to 
individual actors for references to social structure.
7
 There seem to be two main 
arguments deployed to justify this. First, actor network theorists frequently argue that, 
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however stable collective arrangements may have been in the past, today they are so 
fluid that to think in terms of stable social structures is obsolete. Second, they argue 
that whenever some structural influence is suggested, we can understand what is 
happening better by tracing the connections between individual actors than by 
attributing any causal influence to larger structures.  
Both arguments can be introduced by looking at a paper by Michel Callon, 
cited as an exemplary case of ANT by Latour (Callon 1986; Latour 2005: 107). 
Callon argues for the methodological principle of free association, which avoids the 
use of a priori categories to refer to the identities of actors and the relationships 
between them. Instead these are ‘allowed to fluctuate’ and ‘to take their course’ as the 
actors concerned negotiate them in the course of the events being studied (Callon 
1986: 222). For Callon, then, the technique of tracing particular connections follows 
from the need to capture the fluidity of the ‘alliances’ developed during the period. 
Law develops this argument a step further: for him, the social is not only 
rapidly changing, but also sometimes indefinite in form (Law 2004: 6). To put it 
graphically, ‘in this way of thinking the world is not a structure, something we can 
map with our social science charts. We might think of it, instead, as a maelstrom or a 
tide-rip. Imagine that it is filled with currents, eddies, flows, vortices, unpredictable 
changes, storms, and with moments of lull and calm’ (Law 2004: 7).  
Latour, on the other hand, does not rest his argument on the instability of 
structures and thus on some novel feature of certain parts of the contemporary world. 
He argues that conventional sociology – the ‘sociology of the social’ (Latour 2005: 9) 
– takes for granted the existence of ‘a stabilized state of affairs, a bundle of ties that, 
later, may be mobilized to account for some other phenomenon’ (Latour 2005: 1) and 
treats these as a ‘reservoir of forces’ (Latour 2005: 35) that can be drawn on to 
explain human behaviour. He ascribes a thoroughly static view of structure to this 
approach: ‘for sociologists of the social, the rule is order while decay, change, or 
creation are the exceptions’ (Latour 2005: 35). And he suggests that this becomes a 
way to ascribe explanatory force to social structures without justifying such 
ascriptions: ‘hidden variables have become packaged in such a way that there is no 
control window to check what is inside’ (Latour 2005: 50). Overall, ‘The social of 
sociologists thus appears … [as] a superfluity, a purely redundant rear-world adding 
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nothing to the real world except artificial conundrums – just like the ether before 
relativity theory’ (Latour 2005: 107). 
For Latour, the idea that power can come from some central social source and 
then diffuse through society is more or less incoherent. Instead, he argues, influence 
passes along chains of agents, ‘each of whom ‘translates’ it in accordance with his/her 
own projects… In the translation model the study of society therefore moves from the 
study of the social as this is usually conceived, to a study of methods of association’ 
(Latour 1986: 264).
8
 Thus, instead of the sociology of the social, Latour proposes a 
‘sociology of associations’ (Latour 2005: 9), a sociology that traces these associations. 
In this model, any collective influence is always passed through chains of mediators, 
who actively shape and translate that influence in ways that correspond to their own 
projects and purposes, as opposed to intermediaries, who transmit tokens of authority 
unchanged (Latour 2005: 39). In the sociology that results, ‘there is no society, no 
social realm, and no social ties, but there exist translations between mediators that 
may generate traceable associations’ (Latour 2005: 108-9). 
On occasion Latour talks as if there are nevertheless some social entities that 
should feature in sociology, although we should always begin by tracing the 
associations. For example, he writes ‘Although there is indeed, in every interaction, a 
dotted line that leads to some virtual, total, and always pre-existing entity, this is just 
the track that should not be followed, at least for now’ (Latour 2005: 166). Here 
Latour talks as if he were just deferring the moment at which structure is recognized, 
yet he never seems to finally arrive at this moment.  
It is only in the hands of the actors themselves that social structures seem to be 
allowed, and sociologists must content themselves with ‘mapping the many 
contradictory ways in which social aggregates are constantly evoked, erased, 
distributed, and reallocated’ (Latour 2005: 41). And: ‘it is not the sociologist’s job to 
decide in the actor’s stead what groups are making up the world and which agencies 
are making them act’ (Latour 2005: 184). 
Even when the actors themselves do perceive some structural influence, 
Latour seeks to explain this influence in terms of individual mediators. Thus, in the 
project that is the subject of his book Aramis,  
the few elected officials recruited by the project certainly don’t count as Politics; 
the economists who calculate profit margins don’t constitute Economics; the 
handful of engineers who evaluate Aramis’ technological refinement certainly 
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don’t equate with Technology. The impression of a context that surrounds the 
project comes from the fact that one forgets to count the handful of mediators who 
speak in the name of money, Official Bodies, chips, or voters (Latour 2005: 134). 
ANT therefore presents what critical realists would call a flat ontology in not 
just one but two respects: in addition to its neglect of realities beyond the empirical 
domain, it also strives to ignore the existence of emergent social structures. Indeed 
Latour himself entitles a chapter ‘How to Keep the Social Flat’ (Latour 2005). Higher 
structural levels appear only as figments of actors’ imaginations, as constructions they 
make of their personal contexts, which in reality can be reduced to handfuls of 
mediators with whom they associate. 
A realist response 
It’s rarely clear which sociologists Latour is criticising when he portrays – one might 
say caricatures – a ‘sociology of the social’. No doubt there are still sociologists who 
uncritically ascribe causal powers to social structures without examining how they are 
produced by the interaction of human agents. But it should already be clear that at 
least some parts of Latour’s critique do not apply to the critical realist account of 
social structure.  
Most obviously, the critical realist model sees social structures as being 
composed of human individuals, and as being reproduced and/or transformed by the 
actions of those individuals. Both Bhaskar and Archer’s models of structure not only 
place structural change in the centre of their accounts, but even give it an explicit role 
in the names they apply to these models: both the ‘genetic’ in Archer’s morphogenetic 
cycle and the ‘Transformational’ in Bhaskar’s TMSA refer to the dynamic of 
structural change. In these models, structures are constantly made and re-made 
through human agency. This allows for structural fluidity, but also for structural 
stability. Indeed, ANT’s refusal to theorize structural stability must count as one of its 
gravest weaknesses; much of contemporary society may well be fluid, but there are 
still massive stabilities, over a variety of time frames, which are enormously 
important in contemporary society. Many of the most significant social structures in 
Western society, for example, simultaneously demonstrate aspects that have evolved 
over time and aspects that remain more or less unchanged, such as the institutions of 
contract, property, and monogamy, and organizations such as states, schools, and 
   16
  
armies. No social theory can be adequate unless it can theorize both change and 
stability in social structures. 
On the other hand, I will argue that ANT’s techniques of tracing the 
connections at the level of individual actors have a great deal to contribute to such a 
theory. Indeed, critical realists need to do more of this: the realist models of social 
structure recognize the important role of individuals in principle, but relatively little 
work has been done in the CR tradition on tracing the connections between 
individuals and social structure in practice. Tracing these connections, however, does 
not necessarily lead to ‘keeping the social flat’. In an emergentist understanding of 
social structure, we need to trace them not in order to substitute individual 
associations for social structure, but instead to identify the mechanisms that underlie 
social structures; the kinds of relations between individuals that lead to emergent 
properties at the structural level.  A realist sociology of associations would trace 
associations in order to explain structure, not in order to explain it away.  
For this to work, however, we must recognize that social structures are not to 
be equated in general with ‘the structure of the social’, in which the social stands for 
society as a whole. Social structures, in the realist model, are specific collectives with 
specific properties. Most obviously, organizations are social structures, with causal 
powers that arise from the way that their members are related by occupying 
organizationally-defined roles (see Elder-Vass 2007a). A little more subtly, normative 
communities are social structures, with the power to institutionalize our behaviour 
(see Elder-Vass 2008). This tradition, then, has no truck with the sort of invocation of 
an amorphous ‘social’ that Latour criticizes with his portrait of ‘the sociology of the 
social’.  
Intriguingly, ANT itself seems occasionally to invoke more specific social 
structures of the type theorized by realists, despite its anti-structural rhetoric. Latour, 
for example, seems happy to treat the Aéroport de Paris (the organization, it would 
seem, rather than, or perhaps including, the physical airport) as an actor in the story of 
Aramis (Latour 1996: 57). And Law seems to refer to the hinterland of scientific 
knowledge and instrumentation in terms that seem remarkably similar to Bhaskar’s 
transformational model of social activity – this hinterland has a formative impact on 
scientific action, and that action in turn reproduces and/or transforms the hinterland 
(Law 2004: 28-32). What is absent from such treatments, however, is any recognition 
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that in citing these organizations and hinterlands as causal contributors ANT is 
moving beyond a flat social ontology. 
If they wish to preserve this flat ontology, as it seems they do, actor network 
theorists have to reduce these structural effects to those of individuals. A classic 
example is provided by Latour when he discusses the importance of commitments to 
the continuation of a technological project. A government official, according to 
Latour, ‘may speak for all French people’, or for a particular department, or some part 
of a department, or just himself (Latour 1996: 44). This, according to Latour, is to be 
accounted for as a variation in the relative size or representativeness of an individual 
actor. Similar arguments apply to the representatives of the other organizations 
involved. And so, at a stroke, the causal contribution of the organizations that fund the 
entire project is reduced to the effects of a few individuals.  
But it is perfectly obvious that these individuals could not commit these funds 
if they did not occupy particular roles as parts of these organizations. No organization: 
no funds: no project. In other words, we must recognize that sometimes when 
individuals act, they do so as representatives of larger structures; that their action is 
not the action of an individual alone, but at least in part the action of a structure. This 
need not reduce those individuals to mere intermediaries: the structure concerned will 
only ever co-determine their actions in conjunction with other causal factors. But nor 
does it alter the fact that the individual sometimes deploys causal powers of the whole 
organization, and not just those of their own person. 
Sociology, then, cannot dispense with structure, and critical realism provides 
an account of structure that recognizes its relation with individual agency without 
reducing it entirely to such agency. Critical realism would benefit from devoting more 
attention to tracing the associations that make this possible – but this is entirely 
compatible with its ontological commitments. Actor network theory, on the contrary, 
could only recognize the causal contribution of social structure by abandoning its 
ontological commitments. 
Actors and agency 
ANT’s denial of structural power places the burden of sociological explanation on the 
causal influence of actors, as we have seen in Latour’s emphasis on the role of 
mediators in the chains of translation through which power operates. One of ANT’s 
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characteristic theoretical moves, however, is to widen the category of ‘actors’ beyond 
human agents, extending it to include non-human objects too. Such objects are 
‘participants in the course of action’ because they ‘make a difference in the course of 
some other agent’s action’ (Latour 2005: 70-1). The point of their argument is a 
valuable one: sociologists have tended to neglect the causal influence of non-human 
objects, focusing instead on human agents and social structures that are in some sense 
a product of human agents. This is particularly problematic when we are dealing with 
the areas of science and technology, given that these are largely concerned with the 
understanding and manipulation of non-human objects – though one might make a 
similar argument with regard to almost every field of human activity.  
ANT’s technique for redressing the balance is to call for non-human actors to 
be treated symmetrically with human actors (Callon 1986: 200; Law 2004: 102). 
Callon’s paper on the scallops and fishermen of St Brieuc Bay is paradigmatic here. 
The paper tells the story of a group of marine biologists (‘the researchers’) who are 
trying to maintain scallop stocks in the face of over-fishing. What is most striking 
about this paper is that Callon constantly seeks to treat the scallops and the fishermen 
in similar terms. Thus, for example, he argues that the researchers ‘join forces with 
the scallops, the fishermen, and their colleagues’ (Callon 1986: 208), and that ‘both 
the fishermen and the scallops end up being represented by the three researchers who 
speak and act in their name’ (Callon 1986: 216). This is an intriguing provocation, but 
not an unreasonable one.  
Yet some of Callon’s other attempts to treat scallops and fishermen 
symmetrically are frankly bizarre – or at least appear to be so in the standard English 
translation.
9
 For example: ‘In fact, the three researchers will have to lead their longest 
and most difficult negotiations with the scallops’ (Callon 1986: 211). ‘As we have 
seen, the negotiations between the scallops and the researchers revolve around one 
question: how many larvae can be trapped?’ (Callon 1986: 215). And ‘The scallops 
become dissidents. The larvae which complied are betrayed by those they were 
thought to represent’ (Callon 1986: 220). 
Latour, too, adopts this sort of symmetry:  
To get Aramis past the paper phase into the prototype phase, you have to get a 
whole list of things interested in the project: a motor, an ultrasound sensor, 
assorted software, electric currents, concrete-and-steel sandwiches, switching 
arms… The same sort of involvement that has to be solicited from [various 
organizations] now has to be solicited from motors, activators, doors, cabins, 
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software, and sensors. They, too, have their conditions; they allow or forbid other 
alliances (Latour 1996: 57). 
As a literary device, such metaphors are stimulating. As a device for 
provoking the recognition of a gap in conventional sociological reasoning, they are 
effective. As a methodological requirement for sociological work, they are thoroughly 
misguided.
10
 Scallops don’t negotiate, represent, or betray. Motors don’t become 
interested in projects or allow or forbid anything. (It is possible, of course, that Latour 
does not intend us to take such claims literally – see my earlier footnote on translation 
issues. If this is so, then my comments here are only required as a warning to literal-
minded Anglophone readers like myself). 
For critical realists, scallops, motors, and other non-human objects are 
significant in sociological explanations because they have causal powers – just as 
human agents are significant in sociological explanations because they have causal 
powers.
11
 But scallops have different causal powers from humans, and different causal 
powers from motors. Scallops have the power to attach themselves to rocks or to the 
collectors used by researchers; they do not have the power to negotiate. Motors have 
the power to drive vehicles in certain conditions (but not in others); they do not have 
the power to be interested, to allow, to forbid. These are all powers that depend upon 
mechanisms possessed by humans and not by non-human objects. The differences in 
structure between these different sorts of entities lead to them possessing different 
capabilities, and the terms we use in describing them need to be sensitive to the 
capabilities they possess. We achieve symmetry in the treatment of human and non-
human actors, not by treating them all in the same terms, but by treating each in the 
terms that are appropriate to its own particular structure and properties. 
Indeed, one of the merits of critical realism is that it applies just this sort of 
symmetry to the treatment of human agents and social structures. In critical realism’s 
emergentist ontology, as we have seen, we recognize that social structures are 
composed primarily of human beings, and accept the obligation to demonstrate how it 
is that structures of this sort could have the particular powers that we ascribe to them 
– by tracing the connections, the mechanisms, through which these powers are 
generated. When it comes to human agents, critical realism accepts just the same 
obligation: we need to recognize that human beings have biological (and particularly 
neurological) structures from which our capabilities arise, and hence we cannot 
coherently ascribe powers to human beings unless we are also prepared to examine 
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how it is that these structures can produce these powers. Human agency, in other 
words, is no less problematic than social structure, and requires the same sort of 
attention to explaining how it works.  
This is a massive subject, and no theorist can be expected to cover it in its 
entirety, but a major contribution to its understanding has already been made in the 
work of Margaret Archer, whose recent books on agency (Archer 2000; Archer 2003; 
Archer 2007) examine the way that each of us develops a series of identities and a 
particular style of reflexivity. Elsewhere I have examined how the emergence of 
human beliefs and dispositions from neurological underpinnings can help us to 
understand human action (Elder-Vass 2007b). And there is a vast reservoir of work 
from other traditions that can be integrated into the explanation of human agency in 
realist and emergentist terms. 
But ANT seems largely to ignore the need for any such work. Its desire for 
symmetry seems oddly circumscribed. Latour has opened up the question of action 
occasionally; but his approach is primarily to place the contributors to action outside 
the actors, rather than examining how the actors themselves could ever come to act: 
‘An “actor”… is not the source of an action but the moving target of a vast array of 
entities swarming toward it’ (Latour 2005). And ‘Humans and non-humans take on 
form by redistributing the competences and performances of the multitude of actors 
that they hold on to and that hold on to them’ (Latour 1996: 225). When he does begin 
to look inside the actor, it is not to examine the inherent structure, but to suggest that 
contemporary human agents are built up to a state of completeness by plugging in 
circulating entities – ‘subjectifiers, personnalizers, or individualizers’ – that he 
compares to the plug-ins, applets, and patches we can obtain for our computer 
software from the Internet (Latour 2005: 207). And ‘Subjectivity seems also to be a 
circulating capacity, something that is particularly gained or lost by hooking up to 
certain bodies of practice’ (Latour 1999: 23). 
There is no attempt here to explain how humans can be actors at all, no 
attempt to trace the connections underlying them. This seems radically contradictory 
to the rhetoric with which social structure is approached: ‘When we list the qualities 
of an ANT account, we will make sure that when agencies are introduced they are 
never presented simply as matters of fact but always as matters of concern, with their 
mode of fabrication and their stabilizing mechanisms clearly visible’ (Latour 2005: 
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120). Yet the agency of human individuals is largely taken for granted; symmetry, it 
seems, does not apply here. 
I can only speculate on why this might be; but for a realist an obvious answer 
is waiting in the wings: ANT’s realism is not just actualist but also empiricist. It 
uncritically accepts the reality of the objects and capabilities that we can perceive 
directly with our own senses, and largely refuses to believe in the reality of anything 
else. So human agents and non-human objects are so obvious that we can take them 
for granted; but for actor network theory social structure does not exist at all. 
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to engage openly and constructively with actor network theory 
from a critical realist perspective. There are two strands to its argument. On the one 
hand, I have sought to identify things that realists can learn from actor network 
theory. On the other, this paper has presented a robust critique of the limitations 
placed on actor network theory by its ontological commitments, and in particular by 
the multi-dimensional absence of a depth ontology. Both sets of conclusions derive 
from the analysis of three provocations offered by actor network theory. 
The first provocation: that science creates the world it describes. This is 
superficially a constructionist claim, and as such the critical realist reflex would be to 
reject it out of hand. And yet there are a great many things that humans do construct, 
including many of the actualities implicated in science. This does not mean that these 
things are not real, and one of the challenges for critical realism is to develop a more 
subtle account of the relation between reality and social construction. Yet actor 
network theory’s own account of this relation is fatally flawed by its empiricism. Not 
only does it fail to recognize the existence of mechanisms that are independent of and 
anterior to scientific investigations; it often fails even to recognize the existence of 
actualities prior to their observation and description by professional observers. 
The second provocation: that social explanations should always be framed in 
terms of associations between individual actors. There is a great deal of value in 
ANT’s demand that we trace the associations between actors; we cannot give a full 
account of the workings of social structures unless and until we can explain how it is 
that these structures are produced by associations between actors. Critical realists 
need to do more of this, to demonstrate the value of an emergentist account of social 
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structure in practice, and not just from a more abstract perspective. Yet once again, 
actor network theory offers only a provocation and not a viable alternative, and again 
it is because of the absence of depth in its ontology. This absence obscures from actor 
network theory the possibility that social structures can be causally effective in their 
own right, even though they are composed of human actors, and the possibility that 
when humans act, it is sometimes a case of structures acting through them. 
The third provocation: that human and non-human actors should be treated 
symmetrically. This is a valuable reminder, still not taken to heart by many 
sociologists, that non-human objects have causal powers that make a vital 
contribution to the causation of social events. But critical realism’s ontology provides 
a much more appropriate form of symmetry than the self-consciously naïve 
application of the same terminology to human and non-human actors advocated by 
actor network theory. Critical realism’s symmetry appears in the recognition that it is 
the possession of causal powers that is held in common by these two groups of actors, 
while the particular causal powers (and hence the particular terminology appropriate 
to their description) vary depending on the underlying structure and mechanisms of 
each type of actor. Once again, it seems that actor network theory is hampered by its 
failure to see beyond the empirical face of reality. 
Given the ontological chasm between these two traditions, synthesis appears 
out of the question, but I hope this paper has demonstrated that constructive critical 
engagement is worthwhile. 
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1
 An earlier version of this paper was presented to the British Sociological Association’s Realism Study 
Group, and this version has benefited from the comments made there, particularly by Dave Byrne, and 
elsewhere by Andrew Sayer. Malcolm Fowles (via Ivan Horrocks) has made me aware of important 
doubts concerning the translation into English of some of the work discussed below. 
2
 For example, Mutch suggests that ANT has turned away from the excesses of the linguistic turn since 
its early years (Mutch 2002: 486). 
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3
 Bhaskar’s argument is discussed in much more depth in (Elder-Vass 2005) and (Elder-Vass 2007c). 
4
 This is particularly clearly expressed in (Pawson 1989: 106-7). 
5
 This is therefore a relational version of the concept of emergence, in which it is possible to explain an 
entity’s emergent properties in terms of the properties of its parts and the relations between them, but 
not to eliminate the whole entity from the explanation as a result. Many philosophical accounts of 
emergence adopt a strong version of emergence, in which it is not possible to explain emergent 
properties in terms of lower level parts and relations, but examples of such emergence are hard to find. 
6
 I have sought to refine her argument in (Elder-Vass 2007a). 
7
 ANT stresses that ‘actors’ may be non-human as well as human. While I neglect this argument in the 
present section, I will return to it in the section on agency. 
8
 Note the similarities to Foucault’s concept of power as action upon the action of others (Foucault 
2000: 20). I am grateful to Andrew Sayer for pointing this out. 
9
 To be fair to Callon, I should point out that this translation may not be reliable. It is possible, for 
example, that in the quotes given here a more accurate translation would be ‘interactions’ rather than 
‘negotiations’.  Here and elsewhere, Malcolm Fowles has suggested, “alternative English translations 
exist which avoid the sense of volition by inanimate objects” (personal communication). If Callon has 
been misrepresented, my critique of the anthropomorphisation of his scallops would be unnecessary, 
except as a warning to readers of the translation. 
10
 See (Mutch 2002: 489-90) for an earlier critical realist response that both recognises the need to 
“render technology a little more visible” and rejects ANT’s version of symmetrical treatment of human 
and non-human actors. 
11
 Amongst critical realists, Ted Benton in particular has argued against dualistic oppositions between 
nature and society in the social sciences (e.g. Benton 1991: 25). 
